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Book Reviews
PmixPrurrms LAw iN AcrioN. By Jesse Dukemmier, Jr. University of
Kentucky Press, Lexington, Ky., pp. 168, 1962.
Every general practitioner must be concerned with and understand
the awesome and terrible realities of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Despite the protestations of attorneys that they don't and won't en-
counter perpetuity problems in practice, the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities is a potential problem for any attorney since any attorney may
draft a will, deed,. or trust, and may have to examine a title in the
course of representing a buyer in a real estate transaction. Perpetu-
ity problems may arise in a great number of practical situations. For
example, many practitioners represent clients who are desirous of
benefiting their children and grandchildren. If the attorney decides
to establish an mter-vivos trust for the benefit of the client's chil-
dren, with a remainder to the grandchildren living at the death
of the children, care must be exercised that the Rule Against Per-
petuities is not violated.' Likewise, if a client desires to benefit his
son, his sons widow, and their surviving children, perpetuities prob-
lems may develop. This is especially true where there is a possibility
of the son divorcing his current wife and remarrying.2 Furthermore,
the penalties for violating the Rule may not be limited merely to the
transferor and his intended beneficiaries. The spectre of a malpractice
suit against the attorney who drafts a will violative of the Rule has
arisen.8
The task of the attorney in this area has been further complicated
by intensive legislative activity Since 1955, the Rule has been sub-
jected to legislative treatment in California, 4 Connecticut, 5 Idaho,6
Kentucky,7 Maine," Maryland, 9 Massachusetts, 0 Montana," New
York, 12 Pennsylvania, 3 Vermont,14 and Washington.15
'Sparks, Perpetuities Problems of the General Practitioner, 8 U. Fla. L. Rev.
465, 471 (1955).
2 Id. at 472.
3 See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), 75 Har. L.
Rev. 620 (1962), 42 B.U.L. 11ev. 256 (1962).
4 Cal. Civ. Code §771.
5 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§45-95, 45-99 (1960).
6 Idaho Code Ann. §55-111 (1957).
7 Ky. Rev. Stat. §381.215 (1962).8 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 160, §§27-33 (1959).
9Md. Ann. Code art. 16, §197A (Supp. 1960).
1o Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184A (Supp. 1961).
11 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§67-406, 67-407 (Supp. 1961).
12 N.Y. Real Property Law §42.
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The practical problems posed by the Rule and the legislative fer-
ment in this corner of the law have converged to make an understand-
ing of the Rule an urgent necessity Any vacuum in an attorneys
understanding of the Rule will be more than adequately filled by Pro-
fessor Dukemmier s well-written book. This book is a concise, cogent,
and comprehensive literary and legal gem.
Although this book should now be recognized as the primary
authority oii the Rule in Kentucky, it is of immense value to attor-
neys everywhere for a number of reasons. First of all, -it contains
an excellent summary of the technical refinements of the Rule and
its policy implications. In this respect, it is in the tradition of Pro-
fessor Leach s classic article, Perpetuities in a Nutslell. In passing,
it should be noted that Professor Leach wrote the foreword to this
book.,Having two fine scholars like Leach and Dukemmer in one
volume is like having Lloyd's insurance on the success of a venture.
Second of all, this book describes and explains the recently enacted
Kentucky Perpetuity statute which contains "wait and see" and "cy-
pres" features. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities has been
aptly described as a "might-have-been" rule.'7 The common law rule
invalidated an interest if there was- even a remote or fantastic possi-
bility, at the outset, that the interest might vest beyond the perpetuity
period. Under the Kentucky statute, the validity of an interest is
determined at a later date upon the basis of what actually happens.
If despite "waiting and seeing," the interest is still void under the
Rule, the Court is directed, under the cy-pres provision, to reform
the instrument (within the limits of the Rule) to approximate most
closelh the intention of the creator of the interest. The explanation
of these innovations should be helpful to lawyers and legislators in
other states. Due to the missionarv-like zeal of Professor Leach, a
nationwide statutory trend appears to be developing in favor of the
adoption of "wait and see"' 8 and "cy-pres"19 provisions.
13 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §301.4(b) (1958).
14 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 27 §501 (1959).
15 Wash. Rcv. Code §§11.98.010-11.98.050 (1952).
16 51 Harv. L. Rev. 6:38 ('1938).
17 Set' Leach. Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rules Reign of Terror,
65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 728 (1952).
18 See the Connecticut, Maine, Marvland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ver-
mont, and Washington statutes cited, notes 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 15 supra.
19 Cou pled with their "wait and see" provisions Vernont and AVashlngton.
like Kentucky. have complete "ey-pres" provisions. See statutes cited, notes 14
aid 15 supra. See also Idaho Code Ann. §55-111 (1957). In addition, in Connec
ticut, Maine. Mar'land, Massachusetts, and New York, there are limited cy-pres
provisins which are operative to save gifts which are contingent upon any per-
son attaining an age in excess of 21. See statutes cited, notes 5. 8, 9, 10, and
12 supra.
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This book is also of importance to lawyers and legislators in states
in which the Rule Against Perpetuities has been developed in a maze-
like fashion in an impassable jungle of "disorganized confusion"20
alongside of such rules as the Suspension of the Power of Alienation
Rule and the rules relating to Restraints on Alienation. Such a labyrm-
thine state of affairs has existed in such states as Arizona,2' Cali-
fornia,22 the District of Columbia,23 Idaho,24 Indiana,2 Michigan,
26
Minnesota,27 Mississippi, 28 Montana,29 New York,30 and Oklahoma. s3
Professor Dukemmiers keen analysis of the situation in Kentucky
and his solution of eliminating the confusion by abolishing the sus-
pension of the power of alienation rule and declaring the common
law rule to be in existence should prove to be of invaluable assistance
to lawyers and legislators in other jurisdictions who have been strug-
gling with the same problems.
20 Cbairman of the Kentucky Judiciary Committee as quoted in Dukemmier,
Perpetuities in Action 52 (1962).
.1 Transfers of land are governed solely by a suspension of the power of
alienation rule. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §33-261 (1956). Transfers of personaltv are
governed solely by the common law rule. Lowell v. Lowell. 29 -Anz. 138, 240
Pac. 280 (1925).22 Pnor to 1959, California had both a suspension of the power of alienation
rule and the common law rule. See Turrentine, The Suspension Rule and Other
Statutory Restrictions on Alienation in California, 9 Hastings L.J. 262 (1958).
23 The language of the D. C. Code is phrased in terms of the suspension of
the power of alienation but it is possible that the Distnct also has the common
law rule. D. C. Code tit. 45, §102 (1961). See Updergraff. The Rule Against
Perpetuities in the District of Columbia, 14 Geo. L.J. 337 (1926).
24 Since 1957, Idaho has a suspension rule applicable onl" to realty. Idaho
Code Ann. §55-111 (1957). Evidently, there is no (and never was) common
law rule relating to remoteness of vesting. Locklear v. Tucker. 69 Idaho 84,
203 P.2d 380 (1949).
2 Since 1945, only the common law rule has been in force. Ind. Ann. Stat.
§51-105 (1951). Pnor to 1945, Indiana had a suspension nile and it is unclear
whether it also had the common law rule. See Gavit, Indiana Law of Flhire In-
terests, Descent and Wills, §129 (1934).
2 Prior to 1949, Michigan had a suspension rule for realt" and the common
law rule for personalty. Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72. 196 N.V
976 (1924); Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955). In 1949
Michigan reinstated the common law rule for all dispositions. Mich. Stat. Ann.
§26.15 (1954).
27 Minnesota is still like pre-1949 Michigan. See note 26 mupra.
28 Realty transfers are governed by a "successive donee" statute aind person-
altv transfers by the common law rule. See Chnsty and Brand. The Mississippi
Two Donee Statute and the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities. :20 Miss.
L.J. 221 (1959).
29 Pnor to 1959, Montana bad a suspension statute and it is unclear whether
the common law rule was in force. See Waterbury, Montana Perpetuities Legis-
lation-A Plea for Reform, 16 Montana L. Rev. 17, 21-29 (1955). Since 1959,
both rules have been in force. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§67-406 67-407 (Supp.
1961).
10 New York has both rules. Matter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 2. 87 N.E. 497
(1909).
si It is unclear which rule is in force. See Browder, Perpetuities tin Oklahoma,
6 Okla. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
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There is yet another value to be derived from the book. It dra-
matically exposes the disparity between what theorists, like Gray, say
the Rule Against Perpetuities is, and how the judges of a particular
jurisdiction interpret the Rule. Like the proverbial chancellors foot,
there may be as many Rules Against Perpetuities as there are judges.
The nationwide significance of the book is dwarfed only by its
importance to Kentucky lawyers. It is a brief writers delight. It
contains an examination of all of the Perpetuities cases decided by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals (and the briefs and records on appeal).
The author also has prepared, in various appendices, tables showing
which cases are consistent with orthodox perpetuities doctrine,
which cases are contrary to orthodox doctrine, and the extent to which
the new statute would affect the results reached in prior cases. Despite
the values that the product of this mode of research has for appellate
practice, I would, however, be remiss if I failed to point out one
shortcoming it has if it is used as the sole source of policy-making
in the legislative field. It fails to take into account the great number
of cases which are settled either before or after a trial ruling and the
cases where the perpetuities issue exists but is never raised.32
The brilliance of this work may also be its major shortcoming.
In the course of reading this volume and its skillful exposure of the
defects in the existing law, one envisions a superior statute to be the
end product. Yet, as I shall shortly demonstrate, the enacted statute is
inadequate in certain respects. In all fairness, however, to the drafts-
man, Professor Dukeminier, a superior but more intricate statute may
have been difficult to "sell" to the legislature.
In attacking the statute, in explanation of which this book was
written, I do not purport to align myself with the so-called "anti-
wait and see" camp.3 3 "Wait and see" legislation has been criticized on
the grounds that it makes the ascertainment of the measuring lives
difficult and prevents an early determination of title. One commen-
tator has even argued that it may preclude an action against a trus-
tee for a breach of trust.34 I, personally, am in total agreement with
Professor Dukemimer that the inconveniences which flow from a
"wait and see" requirement are outweighed by the resulting fairness
32 See Leach, Perpetuities Legislations: Hail, Pennsylvanta, 108 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1124, 1182 (1960).
33 See Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legisla-
•ion, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 965 (1959); Bordwell, Perpetuities From the Point of
View of the Draughtsman, 11 Rutgers L. Rev. 429 (1946); Simes, Is the Rule
Against Perpetuities Doomed? 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (1953).
34 See Simes & Smith, The Law of Future Interests §1280 (2d ed. 1956).
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to the beneficiaes.3 5 I also do not share the view30 that the problem
can be effectively dealt with by specific statutes dealing with specific
problems such as the "fertile octogenenan" and "the unborn widow."
For example, New York has adopted a specific provision purporting
to eliminate the so-called "unborn widow" case.37 While this section
does save the gift to the spouse, which was valid at common law
anyhow, it does not necessarily save the future interest following a
gift to the spouse which was void at common law. Thus, the criticisms
of the Kentucky statute offered by this reviewer are those of a friendly
critic.38
I find the statute to be defective in the following respects:
(1) How long do we wait and see?
The statute does not explicitly tell us how long we "wait and see."
In such circumstances, a reasonable interpretation might be that we
"wait and see" for lives m being and twenty-one years-the perpeti-
ties period. Yet, despite a lack of a manifestation of contrary legis-
lative intent in the statute itself, Professor Dukemmier would have us
believe that we "wait and see" for lives m being or twenty-one years,
but not both. He assumes that such a standard will be applied since
such an interpretation is embodied m the statutes legislative history.
This appears to be a sudden and amazing demonstration of faith in
the judiciary which was primarily responsible for the "disorganized
confusion" of the pre-existing law Such an interpretation, absent an
express manifestation of legislative intent in the statute, is incongru-
ous since it establishes different measuring periods for the basic per-
petuities period and for the time of taking a second look.
It may also be argued (I would hope without success) that the
failure to explicitly state how long we "wait and see" causes the
statute to be void for indefiniteness. Such a contention has been raised
with respect to the measuring lives aspect of the Pennsylvania statute.3 9
Furthermore, the legislative history cited in the text results in
the taking of a second look at the termination of prior life estates
if the future interest is limited to take effect at the termination of
one or more life estates. This appears to be a fair result if there is a
35 For an excellent analysis of the arguments, pro and con, see Waterbury,
Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 41 (1957).3 6 See Bordwell, note 33 supra.
3
7 N. Y. Real Property Law §42.
88 Although it should be apparent that I am not too enthusiastic about
cy-pres.
39 Jones, Measuring Lives Under the Pennsylvania Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 54 (1960).
1962.1
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remainder limited to the children of the life tenant. Suppose, how-
ever, we have a transfer "to A for life, remainder to the children of B
who attain 30." The legislative history cited in the text would not
permit the taking of a second look at the death of the parent B even
though B, under the terms of the statute, is a life in bemgl
Finally, the statute does not explicitly state for how long we
"wait and see" to determine the validity of interests created by the
exercise of power of appointment. Even at common law the court
would take a "second look" at the date of the exercise of a power to
determine the validity of the interests created.40 By the express
language of the Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, and Maryland
statutes, these "wait and see" statutes may give you an opportunity
to take into consideration facts occuring subsequent to the date the
power is exercised.41 Professor Dukemmier does not definitely indi-
cate whether a similar result would be reached under the Kentucky
statute.
(2) The cy-pres prowszon.
The major objection to this provision is that it injects into per-
petuities cases the most difficult of all construction problems, t.e., that
of "decidiig what a dead man would have thought had he thought
about something that he didn't think about."42 Perpetuities litigation
is likely to become more involved, protracted, and costly.43
Professor Dukeminier appears to interpret the cy-pres provision as
mandatory and as precluding the court from decreeing total and/or
infectious invalidity Yet, there may be situations where total and/or
infectious invalidity might be desirable.44
The statute directs the court to reform the interest to approxi-
mate the intent of the "creator of the interest." As applied to powers
of appointment, it is unclear whether the court is to attempt to ap-
proximate the intent of the donee of the power. In passing, it should
be observed that the Leach and Logan Standard Saving Clause45
also suffers from the same ambiguity
The cy-pres provision also appears, as interpreted by Professor
Dukemmier, to permit a court to reform an interest created bv an
40 Ligget v. Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 SAV.2d 720
(1938).
41 2 Casner, Estate Planmng, at 1627-28 (1961).
42 Schuyler, Future Interests in Illinois; Current Maturities and Some Futures.
50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 457 538-39 (1955).
43 Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard its Vest? 56
Mich. L. Rev. 683, 719 (1958).
44 Cf. Sparks, A Decade of Translation in Future Interests, 45 Va. L. Rev.
493, 496 (1959) and Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail Pennsylvania!, 108
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1124, 1148 (1960).
4574 Harv. L. Rev. 1141 (1961).
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exercise of a power of appointment, even though the donor provided
for a gift in default of appointment. It is unclear as to what extent,
if any, the court is to be influenced by the gift in default of appoint-
ment in ascertaining the intent of the creator of the interest.
The cy-pres provision may also cause sub-classes to be inequitably
treated. Although the sub-classes exception to the all or nothing
rule has not been applied in Kentucky as yet, most of the cases re-
jecting the exception may be distinguished on the grounds that the
ultimate gifts were not specifically separated into sub-classes. There
is English authority that the use of per stirpes language does not
create a sub-class. 48 Furthermore, there have been some judicial indi-
cations in Kentucky that the court might be receptive to the sub-class
exception.47 The inequity created is illustrated by the following
example:
Testator devises property to A for life, then to the children of
A for their lives, and upon the death of any child of A, to pay a
share of the principal to such of that deceased child's children as
attain age twenty-five (and they are not to receive the income
in the meantime). A has two children named C-i and C-2, both
of whom were born before the testator died. A second look at A's
death may reveal that A had no other children and that C-I pre-
deceased A leaving surviving an only child, GC-1, who was born
before the testator died. Since GC-I is a life in being, ins gift of
prncipal is obviously valid, even if it is subject to a condition
precedent of attaining age twenty-five, since he must attain twenty-
five within his own lifetime. Hence, GC-i must still attain age
twenty-five to take. However, let us assume that C-2 survives A and
that the children of C-2 (some of whom were less than four years
old at C-2's death) cannot be considered lives in being (more were
born after the testators death). These children mght attain twenty-
five more than twenty-one years after the death of lives in being.
Since a "second look' does not help us, we must utilize the cy-pres
provision. As far as the subclass of children of C-2 is concerned, we
will validate the gift to them by permitting them to take at age
twenty-one since the gift now vests in them no later than twenty-
one years after the death of C-2 (and a "'second look" reveals that
C-2 is a life in being). The inequity is that GC-I who is not a
member of this sub-class must attain age twenty-five before he can
take, while the children of C-2 take upon attaining twenty-one.
(3) The Lives in Being.
Although this statute avoids the problems presented by the Penn-
sylvania statute by defining lives in being as lives whose continuance
has a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of an interest, it
reaches an anomalous result in the area of options. An option which
is personal to A is valid, whereas an option which is assignable by A
4GFeaks v. Moseley 5 App. Cas. 714 (1880).4 7 See Tuttle v. Steele, 281 ky. 218, 135 S.W.2d 436 (1939).
48 See Dulcenmier, op. cit, supra note 20, at 85.
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is valid for only twenty-one years. 48 I do not comprehend why it
shouldn't be valid for either twenty-one or A's lifetime (whichever
is longer) on the theory that A may be used as a life in being.
(4) Related Rules.
It is uncertain whether the statute will be applicable, by analogy,
to certain related rules such as the Rule Against Accumulation and
the Rule Prohibiting the Indestructability of Private Trusts. 49 The
failure to deal with these rules may be justified on the grounds that
it is doubtful whether these rules exist in Kentucky
(5) Vesting.
Professor Dukemmier s graphic analysis of the confusion surround-
ing the meaning of the word "vest" and the uncertainty as to whether
the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities required a gift to vest
in interest or vest in possession is probably the most striking indict-
ment which may be leveled at the statutes failure to deal with these
problems.
(6) Right of Entry.
Under the statute, a fee simple subject to a right of entry becomes
a fee simple absolute if the specified contingency does not occur with-
in thirty years from the date of the creation of these interests. This,
as a practical matter, seriously impedes one from subjecting future
estates following life estates to a right of entry For example, 0
transfers Blackacre to A for life, remainder to B and his heirs so long
as liquor is not sold upon the premises, but if it is, 0 and his heirs may
re-enter and take the premises. If A lives more than thirty years,
O and his heirs will lose the benefit of the restriction. A fairer ap-
proach to the problem would have been to compute the thirty-year
period from the date B's estate became possessory The desirable
certainty of land title could have been achieved by imposmg a re-
quirement that the restriction be re-recorded periodically
Under the statute, a shifting executory interest following a deter-
minable fee is validated for thirty years. Executory interests which
divest a fee are not so benignly treated. Yet, the statute offers no
standard for distinguishing between a fee simple subject to a divest-
ing executory interest and a determinable fee followed by an execu-
tory interest. One of the reasons offered for abolishing the possibility
of-reverter (which the Statute does) is the difficulty of distinguishing
49 See Cohen, The Rule Against Accumulation & "Wait and See," 33 Temple
L.Q. 34 (1959); Tudor, The Impact of Recent Statutory Adoption of the Wait
and See" Princtple on the Common Law Rule Aganst Perpetuities, 38 B.U.L.
Rev. 540 (1958).
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between the possibility of reverter and the right of entry One has
equal difficulty in distinguishing between these two types of executory
interests. Professor Dukeminier has urged elsewhere that there is no
distinction between contingent remainders and executory interests.50
The statute would require us to differentiate among executory mter-
ests.
Finally, while options were subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities
at common law, rights of entry weren't. Frequently, it was difficult to
ascertain whether an option or right of entry had been created. Al-
though the statute does tend to narrow the gap in legal consequence
that exists between the two devices, it offers no divining rod for
identifying these interests.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that it is not the purpose
of this reviewer to sound the alarm for abolition of the statute.
Rather, it is a cry for clarification. Any revision can and should be
based upon Professor Dukemmier s excellent study It is to be hoped
that the critical tone of this review does not obscure the fact that
a contract to buy this unique book would be specifically enforceable.
William Schwartz-
Professor of Law
Boston Umversity
CrvW JusncE; AND TE July. By Charles W Joiner. Prentice-Hall,
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., pp. xviii, 238, no index. 1962.
This work on the role of the jury in the administration of civil
justice consists of two parts: the authors "critique" of the jury, fol-
lowed by a selection of "what thoughtful lawyers and judges have
said about the jury since its mception."1 The initial portion purports
to examine the jury as it operates today, to compare the arguments
pro and con, to marshal what is known about its operations, to put
it in context within the whole framework of government as well as
within the process of resolving disputes between litigants, and
lastly, to examine suggetions for its improvement.2
To the accomplishment of these sizable tasks the author allocates
less than half of the book, or roughly 30,000 wordsl
In actuality, this section of the work amounts to little more than
a highly simplified and somewhat idealized explanation of the oper-
50 Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests; A Requiem for the Dis-
tinction, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 13 (1958).
1 Joiner, Civil Justice and the Jury xviii (1962).
21d. at xvii.
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